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INTRODUCTION
The public prosecutor is responsible for the enforcement of the laws against those who disobey them. Unlike his opposing counsel, whose primary duty is to his client, the prosecutor represents all of the people within his jurisdiction. This creates in the prosecutor's office a position unique to that basic part of our judicial system, the adversary process; for it means that the accused can expect, and indeed must demand, the prosecutor to represent his interests insofar as he, too, is a member of the prosecutor's broad constituency.
As a result, the prosecutor is forced to operate with one hand on the throttle and the other hand poised firmly on the brake. His primary duty is to earnestly and vigorously present the government's case, using every legitimate means to bring about a conviction. m 2 It is not sufficient to not unlike that of the defense in this regard, is to enlighten the jury and to help the jurors remember and interpret the evidence. 7 Its precise value is difficult to determine, although courts long ago recognized defense dosing argument as a constitutional right, "as much a part of the trial as the hearing of evidence." ' Nevertheless, the value of dosing argument to both prosecution and defense can be assessed when considered with reference to the other stages of the trial. While not many cases are won or lost through argument alone, it can be a decisive factor, particularly if the case is a close one. Since counsel is rarely certain which case is close it is unwise and impractical to overlook this last opportunity to plead a case. 9 The restrictions on closing argument do not prevent vigorous presentation of the prosecutor's case to the jury. The prosecutor may, of course, discuss the evidence, pointing out discrepancies and conflicts in the testimony, and argue that the evidence in the record supports and justifies a conviction.'" He may also dwell on the evil results of the crime, urge a fearless administration of the law, and comment on the conduct of the accused."
Furthermore, summation style, content, and presentation vary with each advocate and are not prohibitively limited.U There is no uniform legal It is recognized that a successful argument depends upon a skillful discussion of facts and law, and, especially in a criminal case, the argument, "to be palatable, may require the lubrication not only of appealing organization and presentation, but of emotion as well."
14 Thus, oratory and picturesque language and illustration are each within the boundaries of permissible argument. s But great latitude and freedom of expression can create problems, thereby emphasizing the precarious position of the prosecutor:
When a prosecutor ... oversteps the bounds of strict legal propriety, the defense is quick to use the incident as reason for an appeal to a higher court. But if the defense lawyer does the same thing, to secure acquittal, there is no appeal. Once cleared, no defendant may be retried, no matter how flagrant his attorney's actions. So, many defense counsel do everything short of punishable contempt to provoke a prosecutor into a remark ... which an appellate court might call erroneous influence on a jury. 6 While misconduct during summation does not always require the reversal of conviction," it is 487 P.2d 387 (1971) ; Fisher v. State, 241 Ark. 545, 408 S.W.2d 894 (1966) , cert. denied, 389 U.S. 821 (1967); People v. Pike, 71 Cal. 2d 595, 455 P.2d 776, 78 Cal. Rptr. 672 (1969) ; People v. Brengettsy, 25 Ill. 2d 228, 184 N.E.2d 849, cert. denied, 372 U.S. 948 (1962) ; State v. Potts, 205 Kan. 47, 468 P.2d 78 (1970) ; Kinnett v. Commonwealth, 408 S.W.2d 417 (Ky. Crim. App. 1966); State v. Hudson, 253 La. 992, 221 So.2d 484 (1969) ; Cannon v. State, 190 So. 2d 848 (Miss. 1966) ; State v. Pace, 80 N.M. 364, 456 P.2d 197 (1969) ; State v. Maynor, 272 N.C. 524, 158 S.E.2d 612 (1968) ; State v. Stephens, 24 Ohio St. 2d 76, 263 N.E.2d 773 (1970) ; State v. Berganthal, 47 Wis. 2d 668, 178 N.W.2d 16 (1970) .
3 Smith v. State, 282 Ala. 268, 210 So. 2d 826 (1968) . 1 4 WAL 'z, supra note 9, at 310. An excellent discussion of the closing arguments in the Ruby trial appears at pages 310-36.
15 Williams v. United States, 371 F.2d 141 (10th Cir. 1967 ) (proper to use a "metaphorical illusion," here an unreported "rabbit story," as illustrative of circumstantial evidence); People v. Womack, 252 Cal. App. 2d 761, 60 Cal. Rptr. 870 (1967) ; State v. Potts, 205 Kan. 47, 468 P.2d 78 (1970) ; State v. Gauger, 200 Kan. 515, 438 P.2d 455 (1968) ; State v. Hamilton, 249 La. 392, 187 So. 2d 417 (1966) (law does not hold counsel to niceties of grammar); Cooper v. State, 490 P.2d 762 (Okla. Crim. App. 1971) .
well established that improper argument alone may be sufficient grounds for reversal. 18 But according fair treatment to the defendant does not require advocacy compromise. A summation may be highly damaging to the accused and still be within the bounds of propriety. 19 Vigorousness and fairness are complementary qualities in an effective presentation, at least where the goal to be achieved is what it should be, a just conviction of the guilty. This article will focus on the limitations which the courts, in an effort to enforce adherence to the duties outlined above, have imposed on prosecutorial closing argument in the less academic atmosphere of the criminal trial. The basic purpose of the article is to present, in abbreviated form, the law in this area as reflected in relatively recent court decisions. While no conscious effort was made to exclude analysis and critique, these were at most only secondarily important.
Henceforth the terms "proper" and "improper" are used to characterize the general judicial attitude toward a particular prosecutorial comment. Cases noted where the conviction was reversed solely on the basis of closing argument are marked with an asterisk (*).20
TIE JUDICIAL ROLE IN REGULATING

CLOsiNG ARGUmENT
The trial judge is given, and must exercise, considerable discretion in evaluating the propriety of argument and in curing any alleged defects. 2 ' The '&United States v. American Radiator and Standard Sanitation Corp., 433 F.2d 174 (3d Cir. 1970) .
Of the approximately 1300 cases researched in preparing this article, over 10 percent were reversed on argument alone. In a good many more cases closing argument was also a factor. For a discussion of appellate review, see generally notes 250-67 infra, and accompanying text.
19 Evans v. Illinois, 24 Ill. 2d 215, 181 N.E.2d 80, basic reason for this is the trial court's superior position to judge the effect of counsel's remarks or conduct. In accordance with general principles of review, an appellate court will not interfere unless it finds an abuse of discretion on the part of the trial judge which prejudiced the defendant and deprived him of a fair trial. 2 The trial court's discretionary control also covers more specific aspects of the summation.-First, it decides when the arguments will be made, that is, how soon after both sides have rested or after the jury instructions have been given, depending upon the jurisdiction.n Second, the court sets the time limits for the arguments, normally allowing equal time to both sides. 24 What is a reasonable time is usually a function of a number of factors, including the amount and character of the testimony and other evidence, the complexity of the issues, and the time already consumed in hearing the case. It is generally better for the court to be indulgent 'rather than frugal in granting time, 2 but even when it is frugal, the reviewing court will place special emphasis on whether the time limits were strictly enforced.
26 State v. Johnson, 277 Minn. 230 , 152 N.W.2d 768, cerl. denied, 390 U. S. 990 (1967) ; Carr v. State, 208 So. 2d 886 (Miss. 1968 ); State v. Richards, 467 S.W.2d 33 (Mo. 1971) ; State v. Mayberry, 52 N.J. 413," 245 A.2d 481 (1968) ; State v. Pace, 80 N.M. 364, 456 P.2d 197 (1969) ; State v. Williams, 276 N.C. 703, 174 S.E.2d 503 (1970) ; State v. Henderson, 156 N.W.2d 700 (N.D. 1968 ); State v. Gairson, 484 P.2d 854 (Ore. App. 1971) ; State v. Peterson, 255 S.C. 579, 180 S.E.2d 341 (1971) , cert. denied, 404 U. S. 860 (1971) ; Hunter v. State, 222 Tenn. 672, 440 S.W.2d 1 (1969) ; State v. Lane, 4 Wash. App. 745, 484 P.2d 432 (1971) . 2' United States v. Davis, 260 F. Supp. 1009 (E.D. Tenn. 1966 ; Hunter v. State, 222 Tenn. 672, 440 S.W.2d 1 (1969) . See generally cases cited in note 21 supra.
11 United States v. Prentiss, 446 F.2d 923 (5th Cir. 1971) (not an abuse of discretion to refuse defense counsel permission to argue on the same day that couit gave its oral charge).
2United States v. Salazar, 425 F.2d 1284 (9th Cir. 1970 ; United States v. Gleeson, 411 F.2d 1091 (10th Cir. 1969 ) (restricting to one hour where three defendants and four-day trial); People v. Fairchild, 254 Cal. A pp. 2d 831, 62 Cal. Rptr. 535, cerl. denied, 391 U.S. 955 (1967) ; Hart v. State, 227 Ga. 171, 179 S.E.2d 346 (1971) ; State v. Kay, 12 Ohio App. 2d 38, 230 N.E.2d 652 (1967) (good discussion of this point).
5Tumer v. State, 220 So. 2d 295 (Miss. 1969) . In addition, it follows from the recognition of the defense summation as a constitutional right that the judge's discretion should not be so exercised that the right to argue is effectively denied.
Additionally, the trial court may decide whether the summation shall be split among members of the prosecution team, 2 7 and also whether the defendant who is represented by counsel may himself participate in the summation.2
LIMITATIONS UPON PROSECUTORIAL CLOSING ARGUMENT
THE RELATIONSHIP OF OPENING ARGUMENT TO REBUTTAL ARGUMENT
The prosecution usually makes the first closing argument and is generally granted rebuttal time in which to respond to the defense dosing argument. 2 9 All essential points must be fairly stated in the opening argument so that the defense has an adequate opportunity to respond 30 During the rebuttal the prosecutor may in turn only respond to the defense summation. No new line of argument may be introduced. State v. Davis, 462 S.W.2d 798 (Mo. 1971 ) (letting another prosecutor make rebuttal argument was within the discretion of the trial court).
8 Thompson v. State, 194 So. 2d 649 (Fla. App. 1967 ) (where defense counsel made opening argument, it was proper to refuse defendant permission to make rebuttal argument); People v. Johnson, 45 Ill. 2d 38, 257 N.E.2d 3 (1970) (where court carefully determined that defendant wished to make his own closing argument, it was not an abuse of discretion to refuse defense counsel permission to argue thereafter). 21 This is because the government has the heavy burden of overcoming the presumption of innocence. Statutes adopting this procedure have been held constitutional against challenge on due process and right to counsel grounds. United States ex rd. Parsons v. Adams, 336 F, Supp. 340 (D. Conn.) , a'fd per curian, 456 F.2d 257 (2d ; Preston v. Statej 260 So. 2d 501 (Fla. 1972) . The order of argument may be reversed where the defense has not put on a case. However, in State v. Lee, 277 N.C. 205, 176 S.E.2d 765 (1970) , the court held that where there were several defendants and only one offered evidence, it was proper for the prosecution to open and conclude, in spite of a statute which gave the defense this right where the defense put on no case.
30 State v. Peterson, 423 S.W.2d 825 (Mo. 1968 ) (in opening argument prosecutor did not mention punishment, but in final argument asked for maximum sentence after defense did not mention punishment; held, there was prejudicial error even though the defendant was only given a three-year sentence)*.
31 State v. Randall, 8 Ariz. App. 72, 443 P.2d 434 (1968) ; People v. Bundy, 295 Ill. 322, 129 N.E. 189 (1920) ; People v. McFadden, 31 Mich. App. 512, 188 N.W.2d 141 (1971) . But see Hart v. State, 227 Ga. 171, 179 S.E.2d 346 (1971) (no abuse of discretion in refusing to restrict rebuttal to matters raised by defense in argument).
original argument by the prosecution rebuttal is also not permitted since this would, in effect, constitute a new line of argument to which the defense would have no opportunity to reply. 2 If defense counsel waives its summation the trial court may in its discretion determine whether or not the prosecution may make any further argument.
COlnENTING ON THE LAW
Since the purpose of argument is to enlighten the jury, the prosecutor may comment on the applicable principles of law during summation, emphasizing the theory of the government's case and the criminal law and perhaps the purposes of the particular statutes involved. 34 However, it is improper for the prosecutor to misstate the law, 35 2 State v. Fair, 467 S.W.2d 938 (Mo. 1971 ) (prosecutor in opening argument said he would not ask for the death penalty, then in dosing argument told the jury it could inflict the death penalty after the defense did not argue punishment)*; State v. Wadlow, 450 S.W.2d 200 (Mo. 1970) Cir. 1968 ); People v. Lopez, 249 Cal. App. 2d 93, 57 Cal. Rptr. 441 (1967) ; People v. Sanchez, 65 Cal. 2d 814, 423 P.2d 800, 56 Cal. Rptr. 648 (1967) ; People v. June, 34 Mich. App. 313, 191 N.W.2d 52 (1971) .
32United States v. Bohle, 445 F.2d 54 (7th Cir. 1971) (misstating burden of proof on insanity); United States v. Gambert, 410 F.2d 383 (4th Cir. 1969) Ala. App. 283, 241 So. 2d 125 (1970) (misstating rules of evidence); State v. Makal, 194 Ariz. 475, 455 P.2d 450 (1969) (arguing defendant should be found guilty without regard to issue of insanity)*; State v. Sorensen, 104 Ariz. 503, 455 P.2d 981 (1969) (misstating law regarding introduction of character testimony)*; State v. Cortez, 101 Ariz. 214, 418 P.2d 370 (1966) (arguing that judge would have directed verdict were the evidence insufficient to convict); People v. Modesto, 66 Cal. 2d 695, 427 P.2d 788, 59 Cal. Rptr. 124 (1967) , cert. denied, 389 U. S. 1009 (1967) (misstating law regarding insanity); People v. Asta, 251 Cal. App. 2d 64, 59 Cal. Rptr. 206 (1967) 3 7 since this only confuses the jury and prejudices the accused. In any event, the prosecutor must not instruct the jury on the law, since this is the exclusive task of the court. While all jurisdictions permit comment upon the law within these bounds, there is some conflict concerning the propriety of actually reading to the jury from cases, texts, or statutes. Jurisdictions which prohibit reading assert that this rule establishes a standard of propriety separating the impartial role of the judge from the adversary role of counsel, thus insuring that the role of the judge cdent to convict); People v. Weinstein, 35 Ill. 2d 467, 220 N.E.2d 432 (1966) (repeatedly misstating the burden of proof); State v. Kirtdoll, 206 Kan. 208, 478 P.2d 188 (1970) (failing to state all elements of offense); State v. Shilow, 252 La. 1105 , 215 So. 2d 828 (1968 (misstating burden of proof); People v. Lewis, 37 Mich. App. 548, 195 N.W.2d 20 (1972) (misstating law regarding insanity)*; State v. Molatore, 474 P.2d 7 (Ore. App. 1970) (that acquittal on prosecution for sale of narcotics would constitute double jeopardy for possession prosecution)*; State v. Gosser, 50 N.J. 438, 236 A.2d 377 (1967) (should find defendant guilty even if believed him not guilty by reason of insanity); People v. Fields, 27 App. Div. 2d 736, 277 N.Y.S.2d 21 (1967) (jury should be governed by moral law "Thou Shalt Not Kill"); State v. Myers, 26 Ohio St. 2d 190, 271 N.E.2d 245 (1971) People v. Hall, 1 Ill. App. 3d 949, 275 N.E.2d 196 (1971) (misstating law not error where defense counsel interrupted before thought completed). 36 Parker v. State, 221 A.2d 599 (Del. 1966 7 State v. Harris, 258 La. 720, 247 So. 2d 847 (1971) (where penalty is responsibility of judge alone, sentencing law is not proper subject of argument); State v. Hagerty, 251 La. 477, 205 So. 2d 369 (1967) (proper to refuse to permit reading of irrelevant statutes). See Clay v. State, 122 Ga. App. 677, 178 S.E.2d 331 (1970) (trial court did not err in overruling defense objection to recital from previous case-law construction of statute that a strong presumption arises that charge is true when a party does not explain or refute evidence, even though there was a statutory prohibition to give substance of the statute in a criminal case, where defense counsel did not state the basis for his objection).
11 State v. Smith, 422 S.W. 2d 50 (Mo. 1967) . Cf. People v. Malone, 126 Ill. App. 2d 265, 261 N.E.2d 776 (1970) (proper to refuse defense counsel permission to comment on the meaning of reasonable doubt).
in instructing the jury is not usurped by counsel and the impartiality of the forum not destroyed 9 Nevertheless, it may be permissible to read from the instructions when they are given prior to the arguments. 40 Jurisdictions which hold that it is within the trial court's discretion to permit the reading of the law from approved texts or reported cases from the jurisdiction's appellate courts, which are usually the courts of last resort, do so on the premise that counsel's alternative statements of correct law may be helpful to the jury rather than confusing. 41 When reading is permitted the court must be careful to insure that: (1) any reading and discussion of cases are kept within reasonable limits, both as to the number read and the time consumed; 42 (2) only cases on point from the jurisdiction or statements of law in accord with such are read; 43 and (3) the purpose of the reading is solely to clarify the law in the case and not to prejudice the jury against the accused.
"
When counsel desires to read from cases to the jury, or when there is a question regarding the accuracy or relevancy of a proposed statement of law, the court should be given an opportunity in advance to designate the portions which may be read and the principles which may be discussed. 5 39 People v. June, 34 Mich. App. 313, 191 N.W.2d 52 (1972) (reading statute improper); State v. Shelton, 71 Wash. 2d 838, 431 P.2d 201 (1967 111 (1969) proper to refer to opinions, including lower court opinions if none from appellate courts exist, and texts, since in Maryland jury is judge of law as well as facts).
4 People v. Spaulding, 309 Ill. 292, 141 N.E. 196 (1923) . 4 People v. Lloyd, 304 Ill. 23, 136 N.E. 505 (1922) (improper to read from a federal lower court decision in state prosecution).
" Higgenbotham v. State, 124 Ga. App. 489, 184 S.E.2d 231 (1971) (portion sought to be read not germane to issues); McKeever v. State,. 118 Ga. App. 386, 163 S.E.2d 919 (1968) (same); People v. Andrae, 305 Il. 530, 137 N.E. 496 (1922) (proper to refuse prosecutor permission to read from opinion in prior prosecution of defendant for murder, though the case arose from the same incident, since the questions of law were distinct); People v. Rees, 268 DIL. 585, 109 N.E. 473 (1915) [Vol. 64
LIMITATIONS ON CLOSING ARGUMENT
If counsel's view of the law differs from the court's view, only the latter should be presented.
COMMENTING ON THE EVIDENCE
A trial is a patchwork of bits and pieces of evidence. A jury may not appreciate the significance of many of these scraps until they have been pieced together by an artful advocate."
4
The prosecution and defense counsel are likely to take very different, possibly diametrically opposed, approaches to piecing together the evidence in dosing argument. Hence, as noted previously, the court must confer great latitude in the manner, style, and content of summation.
47
The general rule regarding comment on the evidence is that such comment is proper if it is either proved by direct evidence or is a fair and reasonable inference from the facts and circumstances proved and has bearing on an issue."1 The prosecutor is permitted to argue from his own understanding and interpretation of the evidence 4 " and ; People v. Calpito, 9 Cal. App. 3d 212, 88 Cal. Rptr. 64 (1970) (the practice of reading portions of proposed instructions during argument is discouraged, but within trial court's discretion); People v State v. Propp, 104 Ariz. 466, 455 P.2d 263 (1969) ; People v. Hines, 66 Cal. 2d 348, 425 P.2d 557, 57 Cal. Rptr. 757 (1967) ; Wesley v. United States, 233 A.2d 514 (D.C. Ct. App. 1967) ; Manor v. State, 223 Ga. 594, 157 S.E.2d 431 (1967) (where defense counsel wanted to amend his opening statement after prosecutor did not offer to prove certain matters which had been proved in prior murder trial, it was not error to restrict argument to evidence which was submitted at second trial); People v the defense cannot be heard to complain merely because the prosecutor's reasoning is faulty or his deductions illogical, though the defense may definitely make such points in its own summation. 0 An inference is defined as "a process of reasoning by which a fact or proposition sought to be established is deduced as a logical consequence from other facts, or a state of facts, already proved or admitted."'" For example, where there was testimony that a fingerprint was found in a red substance, and that the victim was severely beaten, the inference that the print was left in blood was proper.5 Similarly, it was within bounds to argue that someone other than the accused punched his time card where there was testimony that there was no way of knowing who punched a particular card;E that the defendant loaded his gun with buckshot where such was recovered from the victim's body;" and that, in view of testimony from a witness that she heard the sound of something hitting the wall and then the sound of the child crying, the defendant, despite his denials, threw his stepchild against the wall.
5 But there is some question whether it is proper to comment on the poor financial status of the accused as a possible motive for robbery or a similar offense.
56
When the prosecutor is merely restating the evidence or testimony his remarks are entirely proper.
6 7 Also appropriate is comment on the evil results of the crime if apparent from the evidence. 50 People v. Washington, 71 Cal. 2d 1061 , 458 P.2d 479, 80 Cal. Rptr. 567 (1969 . 51 BIACK's LAw DicrcoNARv 917 (Rev. 4th ed. 1968). 5 2 People v. Gill, 31 Mich. App. 395, 187 N.W.2d 707 (1971) .
0 United States v. Alexander, 415 F.2d 1352 (7th Cir. 1969 State v. Copeland, 94 N.J. Super. 196, 227 A.2d 523 (1967) (no evidence of impecuniosity should be admitted or commented upon when it will tend to prove motive or willingness to commit crime); People v. Moore, 26 App. Div. 2d 902, 274 N.Y.S.2d 518 (1966) (reference to fact defendant a welfare recipient improper).
5 United States v. Izzi, 427 F.2d 293 (2d Cir. 1970 ) (accusation that defendant had sought to diguise his handwriting in given exemplar was based on expert testimony); Palmore v. State, 283 Ala. 501, 218 So. 2d 830 (1969) People v. Romero, 36 Ill. 2d 315, 223 N.E.2d 121 (1967) (unfounded assertions that defendant started his girlfriend on heroin and made a trip to get drugs); People v. Griffin, 29 N.Y.2d 91, 272 N.E.2d 477, 323 N.Y.S.2d 964 (1971) (where identification in issue, argument that defendant had recently inflicted wound above his eye to create a distinguishing facial mark, where not sustained by evidence and where jury obviously considered it, requesting a magnifying glass to examine a photograph of defendant)*; Bates v. State, 483 P.2d 1384 (Okla. Crim. App. 1971 (stating that defendant's adoptive parents thought him lazy and shiftless where no evidence). See People v. Rhone, 267 Cal. App. 2d 652, 73 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1968) (report of National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders not a proper subject of comment); People v. Donovan, 35 App. Div. 2d 934, 316 N.Y.S.2d 121 (1967) (reference to Senate Rackets Investigation Committee, and Vito Genovese family irrelevant and highly prejudicial).
6o People v. Farrell, 349 Ill. 129, 181 N.E. 703 (1932) (assertion that it was natural to presume that piano boxes transported by defendant contained gasoline; where no evidence); State v. Iverson, 251 La. 425, 204 So. 2d 772 (1967) (had sheriff not taken statement on night of offense, defendant would have claimed at trial that victim was armed); State v. Jones, 277 Minn. 174, 152 N.W.2d 67 (1967) (where evidence showed that co-defendant's accomplice shot with right hand, and defendant was left-handed, improper to argue: "It may be a little awkward to handle a rifle or shotgun with either hand, but this isn't true with a handgun. We know this from* television by the oldtimers when they were in spots like this."); State v. Polsky, 82 N.M. 393, 482 P.2d 257 (Ct. App. 1971) (argument that accused contra6ted hepatitis from injecting himself with heroin was improper where prosecutor was not permitted to elicit testimony that hepatitis could be so contracted and the crime charged matters outside the issues' in the case.
6 ' Such comments are speculation and conjecture which may confuse and mislead the jury. State v. Hopper, 251 La. 77, 203 So. 2d 222 (1967) (there were many pictures which could not be shown to the jury); People v. Hider, 12 Mich. App. 526, 163 N.W.2d 273 (1968) App. 1969) (there were many things that could not be introduced at trial, and the prosecutor was mad and sorry that he could not bring them in)*; State v. Ranicke, 3 Wash. App. 892, 479 P.2d 135 (1970) (that case could have gone on for two weeks had prosecution presented all the evidence iii detail and two hundred witnesses could have been ealled)*. See State v. Smith, 187 Neb. 152, 187 N.W.2d 753 (1971) (explaining police failure to search premises because they were prevented by law from doing so). Garris v. United States, 390 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1968 ) (use of excluded evidence in argument not waived by failure to object); Bowers v. Coiner, 309 F. Supp. 1064 (S.D. W. Va. 1970 ) (argument the defendant "brandished that gun" and "upon this evidence" jury should convict, where gun had been displayed during testimony by police officer but had then been ruled inadmissible)*; People v. Brown, 3 Ill. App. 3d 1022 , 279 N.E.2d 765 (1972 State v. Polsky, 82 N.M. 393, 482 P.2d 257 (Ct. App. 1971) ; People v. Adams, 21 N.Y.2d 397, 235 N.E.2d 214,288 N.Y.S.2d 255 (1968) *; State v. Green, 70 Wash. 2d 955, 425 P.2d 913 (1967) (1970) be improper to refer to evidence which was improperly admitted, 69 or to evidence which was excluded by an agreement between counsel. 0 When there is more than one defendant, and evidence is admitted but restricted to use against less than all of the co-defendants, the prosecutor's remarks must conform to the restrictions71
In conformity to the general rule and the enun-(mentioning blood and hairpiece where neither was in evidence, but there was testimony regarding them); State v. Olek, 288 Minn. 235, 179 N.W.2d 320 (1970) (state may comment on physical evidence which for technical reasons was excluded if there is properly admitted testimony referring to the excluded object); Dickey v. State, 444 P.2d 373 (Wyo. 1968 ) (where knife defendant admitted was his was shown to jury and testimony regarding it given, proper to refer to it in argument whether it was admitted or not Jackson v. State, 465 S.W.2d 642 (Mo. 1971 ) (proper to use and refer to physical evidence in argument, and absent a showing of inadmissibility it must be assumed that the evidence was properly before the jury) with State v. Propp, 104 Ariz. 466, 455 P.2d 263 (1969) (the fact that evidence might have been excluded if objected to does not preclude the prosecutor from referring to it in argument). Precluding comment on improperly admitted evidence may require too much foresight on the part of the prosecutor, though. v0 People v. Mwathery, 103 Ill. App. 2d 114, 243 N.E.2d 429 (1968) (where the prosecutor agreed not to refer to a certain statement but did so anyway, the court said this action might amount to reversible error, but reversed on other grounds). In United States v. Spenard, 438 F.2d 717 (2d Cir. 1971) , the court held that it was proper to argue to the jury that there was no insanity issue in the case regardless of the fact that (1) the government had previously agreed to dismiss the case if the defendant would accept a commitment to a state hospital, or (2) the government had a record of the defendant's prior mental disorder. The court reasoned that to hold otherwise would deny the government the opportunity to attempt to dispose of a case by trial or plea, on pain of being barred from subsequent prosecution. These two cases are not inconsistent, since .M1wathery concerned an explicit agreement regarding the conduct of the trial, while Spenard involved at best an implicit understanding in pre-trial negotiations. For cases recognizing the general validity of agreements between counsel, see United States v. Paiva, 294 F. Supp. 742 (D.D.C. 1969) and Commonwealth v. Benton, 356 Mass. 447, 252 N.E.2d 891 (1969) .
7 People v. McKendall, 30 App. Div. 2d 717, 290 N.Y.S.2d 987 (1968) (reading portions of co-defendant's confession and suggesting that the "other person" mentioned in it was the defendant, where the court had restricted the evidence to the co-defendant who made the confession)*. Smith v. State, 282 Ala. 268, 210 So. 2d 826 (1968) (arguing that fingerprints were present when they were not)*; People v. Graves, 263 Cal. App. 2d 719, 70 Cal. Rptr. 509 (1968) (misstating defendant's testimony as to prior convictions); People v. Durant, 105 Ill. App. 2d 216, 245 N.E.2d 41 (1969) , a.ff'd sub. nora. People v. Wilson, 46 IB. 2d 376, 263 N.E.2d 856 (1970) (attributing to victim statements not in record); State v. Miner, 14 Ohio St. 2d 232, 237 N.E.2d 400 (1968) (misstating testimony of officer so that it seemed victim had identified defendant, when he had not done so)*; Mills v. State, 12 Md. App. 449, 279 A.2d 473 (1971) (attributing testimony to defendant rather than witness); Smith v. State, 446 S.W.2d 317 (Tex. Crim. App. 1969) (in prosecution for raping niece, stating that she was the defendant's daughter); State v. Ross, 290 A.2d 38 (Vt. 1972 ) (argument that defendant was an alcoholic, where no such evidence, in drunk driving prosecution)*. See also State v. Jenkins, 249 S.C. 570, 155 S.E.2d 624 (1967 826 (1968) (argument that one of defendant's fresh fingerprints was found on window shade at scene of crime, where no evidence)*; Kirk v. State, 227 So. 2d 40 (Fla. App. 1969 ) (assertion that defense had represented witness who had not been called as vital to its case where false)*; State v. Hephner, 161 N.W.2d 714 (Iowa 1968) (that chief prosecution witness was acquitted with defendant when he was not); People v. Green, 27 III. 2d 39, 187 N.E.2d 708 (1963) (asserting informer not still a government employee when federal agent had testified that he was); People v. Kirby, 4 Mich. App. 201, 144 N.W.2d 651 (1966) (argument that defendant was not ever in a certain city, as his alibi asserted, was not only an expression of opinion but contrary to information in prosecutor's possession); State v. Streitz, 276 Minn. 242, 150 N.W.2d 33 (1967) (that defendant had failed to take intoximeter test where defendant's testimony indicated that he had consented but was not given test)*; State v. Ward, 457 S.W.2d 701 (Mo. 1970) (misstating that defendant's parole has been revoked); People v. Williams, 37 App. Div. 2d 686, 323 N.Y.S.2d 377 (1971) (after using a prior statement to impeach vitness, prosecutor argued that witness had testified as set forth in statement)*; Barron v. State, 479 P.2d 614 (Okla. Crim. ; State v. McGee, 52 Wis. 2d 736, 190 N.W.2d 893 (1971) (assertion that the only eyewitness had testified where the evidence showed that there were others). See also Bates v. State, 483 P.2d 1384 (Okla. Crim. App. 1971 .
4 United States v. Hudson, 432 F.2d 413 (9th Cir. 1970 ) (where piosecution stated carelessly his recolThere is one recognized exception to the rule that remarks not based in the evidence are improper; such remarks are proper if they concern matters of general knowledge or experience.
7 5
Usually such comments are made by the prosecutor for illustrative purposes or dramatic effect and refer to historical facts, public personalities, principles of divine law, biblical teachings, or prominent current events in the community or the nation. 76 In addition, the statements may also be lection of evidence, where there was no such evidence, it was not error because prosecution correctly stated that jury's recollection was to control, court gave the correct instruction, and defense counsel took advantage of an opportunity to reply to the alleged misstatement); People v 
LIMITATIONS ON CLOSTNG ARGUMENT
permitted where they concern the interpretation of the evidence in the case.
7
PROSECUTORIAL CONDUCT DURING ARGUMENT
General Actions
The considerable latitude permitted the prosecutor in commentary is equally applicable to his conduct during summation. Thus it is generally proper for him to move freely about the courtroom. However, the prosecutor should not sit in the witness chair while delivering his argument since it might give the jury the impression that the argument is testimonial in nature or possibly suggest the truth of the statements made.
78 Also because of the potential impact on the jurors, addressing individual jurors has been repeatedly disapproved." Similarly, remarks directed to the defendant are not condoned." As indicated above, in some circumstances the prosecutor may read the law to the jury from reported cases or approved texts.
7 It is also proper to read from and comment upon books, records, or documents which are properly before the court, 7 though any reference to a change of venue in the case is disallowed. 7 Counsel's recollection may be refreshed from the stenographer's minutes,1 but it is proper to read from the transcript only when the defense concurs that the matter is not in dispute.
1 Where the testimony is disputed, reading is not permitted, on the theory that the jury will decide the thrust of such testimony.
8 While the prosecutor may refer to a memorandum or personal notes regarding the defense summation, 87 it is not proper to read testimony from a personal memorandum rather than the transcript since the memorandum may emphasize the prosecutor's version of the testimony. 
Use of Real and Demonstrative Evidence
The use of and reference to admitted real evidence is widely recognized as proper, so long as the action portrayed conforms with that indicated in the record. 886 (1968) (conduct of prosecutor in using in demonstration a gun which had been suppressed was improper blit not prejudicial for the prosecutor, in describing an event, to pick up and swing a two-wheeled hand cart, suggesting the manner in which the wounds were inflicted, where this was in accord with the testimony. 90 It was also proper for the prosecutor, in attempting to demonstrate the manner in which the defendant's fingerprints were left on a door at the scene of the crime, to show how the door had been pushed back and forth, since there was testimony to this effect.
9
' Furthermore, the prosecutor was permitted to jump repeatedly for about two minutes in a loud and noisy manner on a piece of paper he had thrown on the floor where such conformed with the description of the defendant's treatment of the victim.Y On the other hand, it was error for the prosecutor to stand before the jury for three minutes holding a sawed-off shotgun in his hands since the conditions of the crime had not been adequately recreated.9 3 It may also be proper for the prosecutor to demonstrate the government's theory of the crime where there is no affirmative testimony but his action conforms to the state of the evidence. Thus, it was permissible for the prosecutor to rub a pistol with a shirt, both of which were in evidence, to demonstrate his theory supporting the reason why no prints were found on the gun. The primary question to be asked concerning reference to or use of real evidence is whether the manner of reference or use is such that the juror's fears and prejudices will be aroused in a way which impairs reasoned judgment. 95 While reference to and exhibition of some pieces of real evidence 98 or where defendant's motion that gun be removed from courtroom was granted and there was no indication to jury that the weapon was the one which was suppressed). 90 Bradburn v. State, 269 N.E.2d 539 (Ind. 1971) . 91 People v. Speck, 41 Ill. 2d 177, 242 N.E.2d 208 (1968) .
9 Wright v. State, 422 S.W.2d 184 (Tex. Crim. App. 1967) . The trial court reported to the appellate court that it could not determine the impression the jury may have received from this demonstration. The defense attorney, apparently grasping at straws, objected, "'We object to this outrageous thing, and furthermore the evidence was that he was not on his chest, but that he was on his stomach." S93People v. Wicks, 115 Ill. App. 2d 19, 252 N.E.2d 698 (1969) . 4 People v. Roberts, Ill. App. 2d-, 272 N.E.2d 768 (1971) .
95See State v. Dillon, 93 Ida. 698, 471 P.2d 553 (1970) and State v. Hopper, 251 La. 77, 203 So. 2d 222 (1967) , both discussing the admissibility of particularly gruesome photographs in criminal cases.
96 People v. Speck, 41 Ill. 2d 177, 242 N.E.2d 208 (1968) (where identification in issue, showing jury police drawing/of suspect and asking jury to compare the repetition of an earlier demonstration are proper during argument, 9 7 the prosecutor must be careful to avoid unfair lengthy demonstration or emphatical comment.
It is clear that the use of demonstrative evidence-visual aids not actually admitted into evidence-is appropriate.
9 9 The general requirements for the use of demonstrative evidence are that the conditions shown by the exhibit do not vary significantly from those that existed at the time of the events in _question, and that the exhibit constitutes a "true and fair representation" of what it purports to show.sO As a general proposition, it with defendant); People v. Moore, 35 Ill. 2d 399, 220 N.E.2d 443, cert. denied, 389 U.S. 861 (1967) (display of gun); People v. Robinson, 106 III. App. 2d 78, 246 N.E.2d 15 (1969) (photo of deceased in morgue showing bullet holes, in bench trial).
97 United States v. Higuchi, 437 F.2d 835 (9th Cir. 1971) (contention that court abused its discretion in permitting prosecutor to use an overhead projector as a visual aid during argument in prosecution for transporting forged checks was "completely without merit"); State v. Orzen, 83 N.M. App. 458, 493 P.2d 768 (Ct. App. 1972 ) (no abuse of discretion in permitting prosecutor to show motion picture film in evidence during argument and to stop and reverse film and comment upon what was shown). However, the prosecutor should keep in mind the time limitations, and may not have an opportunity to fully repeat a demonstration during argument. See notes 24-26, supra, and accompanying text.
98 People v. Wicks, 115 Ill. App. 2d 19, 252 N.E.2d 698 (1969) ; Adler v. State, 248 Ind. 193, 225 N.E.2d 171 (1967) (in robbery prosecution, thumbtacking picture of robbery victim's body to a board which jury could see for 45 minutes while instructions were read, and then showing it again and discussing it during argument, was error); Joyner v. State, 436 S.W.2d 141 (Tex. Crim. App. 1969 ) (discussing danger of pistol, pointing it at defendant and pulling trigger, improper).
99 State v. Logan, 156 Mont. 48,473 P.2d 833 (1970) (proper to let prosecutor use a chart not in evidence but based on evidence as a visual aid in connection with bullet holes in body of victim, illustrating computations made by state in connection therewith); State v. Woodards, 6 Ohio St. 2d 14, 215 N.E.2d 568 (1966) (proper during argument to use a bottle, straw, pen, dowel, and a pair of calipers, none of which were in evidence, in a demonstration, in rape prosecution where there was only circumstantial evidence); Garcia v. State, 428 S.W.2d 334 (Tex. Crim. A pp. 1968) (while discussing penetration and presence of sperm in vagina, prosecutor went to blackboard and made a dot which was supposed to be a sperm, and asked jury to observe it and see if it moved; proper as an illustration of medical testimony); State v. Richardson, 44 Wis. 2d 75, 170 N.W.2d 775 (1969) (where prosecutor was discussing identification, argument as to whether either or both of police officers in courtroom had mustache did not compel mistrial on ground of introduction of new evidence, even if officers were turned away from the jury until the argument was made and then simultaneously turned around). courts apply the same rules regarding these questions in criminal cases as they do in civil cases.
T '
COMMENTING ON WITNESSES
The examination of witnesses is likely to take up a good part of any trial. Commentary on the testimony, character, and credibility of the witnesses will often require a proportional amount of the prosecutor's summation. Proper remarks by the prosecutor are those which are reasonably justified by the evidence or testimony, and are restricted to presenting an interpretation of the testimony, pointing out conflicts and inconsistencies, and discussing the reliability of the wit-
The ultimate issue of credibility is for the jury alone.I° For the same policy reasons previously discussed, 10 4 the prosecutor's personal beliefs and opinions as to the truthfulness of the testimony and the character of the witnesses must be avoided; otherwise the veracity of the prosecutor may be placed in issue. ) (that after defendant was caught, the best way for him to get out of his predicament was to hire the best scientists in the country to present their theories that he was psychotic and lost contact with reality during the crime); United States v. Strauss, 443 F.2d 986 (1st Cir. 1971 ) (defense witnesses members of criminal element); United States v. Blue, 440 F.2d 300 (7th Cir. 1971) (prosecutor said he was not asking jury to believe that government witnesses were "nice people"); United States v. Graydon, 429 F.2d 120 (4th Cir. 1970 ) (suggesting defendant's alibi witness had given false testimony); United States v. Lyon, 397 F.2d 505 (7th Cir. 1968 ) (in prostitution prosecution, that evidence was cluttered with disgusting, shocking, maybe dirty, disrespectful, dishonest testimony and ideas); People v. Marino, 95 Ill. App. 2d 369, 238 N.E.2d 245 (1968 ), af'd, 44 Ill. 2d 562, 256 N.E.2d 770 (1970 (evidence justified references to two policemen as the "I don't remember twins" and to police chief as "shifty," and accusation that the three were corrupt); People v. Poe, 27 Mich. App. 422, 183 N.W.2d 628 (1970) State v. Pitts, 256 S.C. 420, 182 S.E.2d 738 (1971) .
01 State v. Jackson, 201 Kan. 795, 443 P.2d 279 (1968) (a matter about which a defense witness is properly questioned is a proper subject for comment).
no People v. Weinstein, 35 Ill. 2d 467, 220 N.E.2d 432 (1966) People v. Magby, 37111. 2d 197,226 N.E.2d 33 (1967) . "1 State v. Dillon, 93 Ida. 698, 471 P.2d 553 (1970) (referring to fact that a defense witness was in courtroom during the testimony of one witness in violation of sequester); State v. Edwards, 471 P.2d 843 (Ore. App. 1970 ) (giving evasive answers); State v. Ruud, 41 Wis. 2d 720, 165 N.W.2d 153 (1969) (where several defense witnesses appeared in court in "outlandish" costumes, proper to refer to them as defendant's "hippie friends").
" 
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in which the prosecutor did not know that such action would be taken until the witness was called to the stand. 116 There is some question concerning the propriety of characterizing a witness as liar or perjurer, however, even if accurate.
17
If justified by the evidence, reference to the fact that a witness was afraid to testify and was given protection may be condoned."' However, when a witness does not testify, it is improper to suggest witness's credibility, with no inference drawn regarding the defendant).
116 Lawrence v. Wainwright, 445 F.2d 281 (5th Cir. 1971 ) (cannot call witness closely identified with the defendant knowing witness will invoke fifth amendment); Cain v. App, 442 F.2d 356 (9th Cir. 1971) 
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character of his commentary: was the language used by the prosecutor manifestly intended to be, or of such a character that the jury would naturally and necessarily take it to be, a comment on the defendant's failure to testify? 22 In contrast, in Texas the language is viewed entirely from the standpoint of the jury, and the implication that the language might be construed as an implied or direct allusion to the defendant's failure to testify must be dear. 124 An even more restricted approach is taken in Alabama, where there must be almost direct identification of the defendant as the individual who has failed to testify; covert references are construed against the defendant, regardless of possible jury inference. 2 4 Under any formulation of the standard it is clear that a blatant and obvious reference to the failure of the accused to testify at trial is improper, whether the remark is made in positiveni or nega- Mich. 1965 ) (even where in fact only defendant could contradict, not error unless the prosecutor may add that the defendant was present at the scene of the crime."' Even more direct comments concerning the defense are permitted. For example, the prosecutor may be permitted to state positively that the evidence is uncontradicted by referring to the fact that no defense was presented, 3 6 or by commenting on the difference in the order of argument when the defense presents no evidence.m Moreover, statements may be made regarding the defense attorney which would be prohibited if made about the defendant,"" such as a statement jury would be likely to conclude from the statement in the context of the argument that such was the situation); State v Williams v. Wainwright, 416 F.2d 1042 (5th Cir. 1969 (that defendant was entitled to opening and final arguments where he puts on no evidence or testimony "other than perhaps his own," and prosecution's summation would be sandwiched since defendant put on no evidence). See Taylor v. United States, 390 F.2d 278 (8th Cir. 1968 An interesting situation arises when the defendant appears pro se. While it has been held improper to point out that the defendant is so appearing, the prosecutor is permitted to refer to and discuss what the defendant says as an advocate. Any other approach would render nugatory the prosecutor's valuable right to attack the defense's theory of the case, obviously permitted when the defendant is represented by counsel. The jury may also be told that the defendant counsel's presentation is not evidence but argument only. ) (counsel "makes the insinuation that this defendant has told him he wasn't guilty, but he won't take the stand under oath and tell you that"). Compare Taylor v. State, 279 Ala. 390, 185 So. 2d 414 (1966) ("I think you believe what the witness said is true, you haven't heard anyone say here that it wasn't except the attorney who was representing the 4le-fendant", and "Are you going to let the man say or let the attorney say, 'I am not guilty of this crime'?") with State v. Hart, 154 Mont. 310, 462 P.2d 885 (1969) (counsel failed to offer any evidence to controvert incriminating testimony of state's witness, was indistinguishable from a prohibited reference where defendant was the only one who could contradict)* and Commonwealth v. Cami, 443 Pa. 253, 277 A.2d 325 (1971) (improper to say jury had never heard counsel ask defendant whether he was responsible for the crime).
1M9 State v. McGonigle, 103 Ariz. 267, 440 P.2d 100 (1968) ; Gathright v. State, 245 Ark. 840, 435 S.W.2d 433 (1968) (proper to say there was no testimony on a point on which counsel had said there would be); State v. Marshall, 15 Ohio App. 2d 187, 239 N.E.2d 755 (1968) . But see People v. Levy, 28 Mich. App. 339, 184 N.W.2d 325 (1970) (improper to say counsel had failed to prove what he had said he would).
'40 People v. Garrison, 252 Cal. App. 2d 511, 60 Cal. Rptr. 596 (1967) .
"I United States v. Warner, 428 F.2d 730 (8th Cir. 1970 ) (inquiring whether jury had heard from the witness stand most of what defendant said in argument was probably erroneous, but remarks would have been proper if applied to counsel not defending When there are multiple defendants not all of whom testify, the courts generally hold that reference to the fact that some testified is improper, since attention is thereby directed to those who did not.
4 2 If such a reference warrants a reversal, it is unclear whether the convictions of those who testified must be reversed along with the convictions of those who did not."4 There is one special relaxation of the prohibition on comment on the defendant's failure to testify at trial. Where the recent unexplained possession of stolen property raises a presumption of guilt, the prosecutor may so state.'4 himself, and were cured by court); United States ex rd. Miller v. Follette, 397 F.2d 363 (2d Cir. 1968) , aff'g State ex rd. Miller v. Follette, 278 F. Supp. 1003 (E.D.N.Y. 1968 ) (proper to remark that witnesses who testified under oath were to be believed rather than petitioner who did not so testify); Petition of DuBois, 84 Nev. 562, 445 P.2d 354 (1968) Cir. 1969 ) (statement that evidence was uncontradicted as to all the defendants except for the two who testified)*; Collins v. United States, 383 F.2d 296 (10th Cir. 1967 )-(where two of three defendants testified, comment on failure of one to testify required the reversal of his conviction alone)*; United States v. Edwards, 366 F.2d 853 (2d Cir. 1966 ) (co-conspirator uncontradicted, improper); People v. Haran, 27 Ill. 2d 229, 188 N.E.2d 707 (1963) (refusal of co-defendants to testify and drawing ad verse inference to defendant)*; People v. Mirenda, 23 N.Y.2d 439, 245 N.E.2d 194, 297 N.Y.S.2d 532 (1969) (that three of five defendants testified)*. See United States v. Haili, 443 F.2d 1295 (9th Cir. 1971 ) ("you know why he was hesitant to testify in this case" referred to co-defendant who testified, not to defendant who did not, but was improper anyway); Moody v. United States, 376 F.2d 525 (9th Cir. 1967 ) (improper to say defendant's accomplice was not rebutted). But see State v. Tollett, 71 Wash. 2d 806, 431 P.2d 168, cert. denied, 392 U.S. 914 (1967) (inadvertent comment that "all testified-excuse me, not testified" was improper); State v. Burrell, 102 Ariz. 136, 426 P.2d 633 (1967) (where counsel for both defendants elicited common defense through testimony of co-defendant, it was harmless to say that the defendant "has said nothing").
"' See Collins v. United States, 383 F.2d 296 (10th Cir. 1967) .
'" United States v. Davis, 437 F.2d 928 (7th Cir.
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LIMITATIONS ON CLOSING ARGUMENT Testinmtny at Trial
The defendant who testifies at trial is subject to cross-examination and impeachment, 1 5 and the prosecutor may comment on this testimony 46 in accordance with the same rules applicable to comments on the testimony of other witnesses.
14 7
Remarks should be restricted to the defendant's credibility.' Characterizing the testimony is proper if the characterization is based on the evidence and is not an assertion of personal belief. 49 1971) (that possession had not been adequately explained, and guilt could be inferred from that alone); Bretti v. State, 192 So. 2d 6 (Fla. App. 1966) ; Aiken v. State, 226 Ga. 840, 178 S.E.2d 202 (1970) , cert. denied, 401 U. S. 982 (1970) ; People v. Tate, 45 Mll. 2d 540, 259 N.E.2d 791, cert. denied, 401 U.S. 915 (1970) ; State v. Branch, 465 P.2d 821 (Mont. 1970) ; State v. Richard, 109 N.H. 322, 251 A.2d 326 (1969) (proper to urge jury to consider such where prosecutor expressly recognized privilege not to testify and only urged jury to consider absence of evidence from other sources to explain possession); State v. DiRienzo, 53 N.J. 360, 251 A.2d 99 (1969) State v. Jackson, 258 La. 632, 247 So. 2d 558 (1971) ; Gray v. State, 463 P.2d 897 (Alaska 1970) .
14 Reilly v. State, 212 So. 2d 796 (Fla. App. 1968 ); State v. Davison, 457 S.W.2d 674 (Mo. 1970) . But see People v. Marino, 95 Ill. App. 2d 369, 238 N.E.2d 245 (1968 ), affd, 44 Ill. 2d 562, 256 N.E.2d 770 (1970 .
48United States v. Deloney, 389 F.2d 324 (7th Cir. 1968 ); State v. Dutton, 106 Ariz. 463, 478 P.2d 87 (1970) (proper to comment on inconsistencies); People v. Forbis, 109 Ill. App. 2d 220, 248 N.E.2d 298 (1969) ; State v. Whiters, 206 Kan. 770, 481 P.2d 922 (1971) ; Dreitz v. Commonwealth, 477 S.W.2d 506 (Ky. Crim. App. 1972 ) (argument that defendant testified so well because of his extensive experience in courtrooms on trial for prior crimes)*; Commonwealth v. Stout, 356 Mass. 237, 249 N.E.2d 12 (1969) (suggesting that state's case was so strong that defendant and his lawyer had decided he should give up his constitutional right not to testify, improper); State v. Harrison, 72 Wash. 2d 737, 435 P.2d 547 (1967 State v. Totress, 107 Ariz. 8, 480 P.2d 668 (1971) ; People v. Goodwin, 261 Cal. App. 2d 723, 68 Cal. Rptr. 247 (1968) (incredible though expected after a plea of not guilty); People v. Sinclair, 27 Ill. 2d 505, 190 N.E.2d 298 (1963) ("cock and bull story"); Raimondi v. State, 12 Md. App. 322, 278 A.2d 664 (1971) (defendant and his witnesses were "political bosses, dishonest and unworthy of belief"); Carr v. State, 208 So. 2d 886 (Miss. 1968) ("fantastic") ; State v. Rose, 270 N.C. 406, 154 N.E.2d 492 (1967) Where the defendant's testimony refutes only part of the government's proof, silence with regard to other damaging evidence which is within the defendant's knowledge is subject to adverse comment. 50 But if the defendant's testimony is topically restricted, the prosecutor may not comment on the failure to testify on other matters.1 5 ' Similarly, where there are several defendants and only some of them assert a particular defense, the prosecutor must restrict any comments accordingly.
52
It should be noted that it is not necessary for the defendant to formally take the stand in order for some comment to be proper. A mere "testimonial appearance" by the defendant may open the door for comment on his failure to deny other evidence or to take the stand. (1969) (where defendant took stand solely for the purpose of testifying on voluntariness of his confession, defendant did not waive privilege, and error for prosecutor to comment on failure to testify on anything other than voluntariness)*; People v. Eaton, 275 Cal. App. 2d 584, 80 Cal. Rptr. 192 (1969) (where defendant took stand only to testify regarding pre-trial identification, and prosecutor did not cross-examine otherwise, improper to comment that defendant did not deny charges against him); Young v. People, 488 P.2d 567 (Colo. 1971) (comments on defendant's failure to deny prosecution witnesses, and his invocation of privilege when questioned about the crime, were proper where nothing in record revealed any ruling by court that defendant could take stand solely to testify on issue of voluntariness of his confession, and it was not reasonably apparent that defendant has been misled).
192 United States v. Leach, 429 F.2d 956 (8th Cir. 1970) .
I," Compare United States ex rd. Mitchell v. Pinto, 438 F.2d 814 (2d Cir. 1971 ) (where defendant did not testify, he did not waive privilege by rising and standing next to a witness to demonstrate his resemblance to him) with State v. Fioravanti, 46 N.J. 109, 215 A.2d 16 (1965) , denial of habeas corpus affd, 404 F.2d 675 (2d-Cir. 1967 ) (appearance by defendant in trousers supposed to have been worn by the robber but which those jurisdictions where the defendant may submit an unsworn statement to the court without waiving the privilege, it has been held that the prosecutor, although able to discuss, criticize, and comment on the statement, may not comment directly on the decision to make such a statement rather than take the stand.15
Other Crimes
A common method to impeach a witness is to elicit testimony or otherwise demonstrate that the witness has been previously convicted of a crime or crimes. When the defendant testifies, or does not testify but attempts to show his good character and reputation, the prosecutor may use this method of impeachment and in summation refer to the prior crimes.1 55 The evidence must be properly before the court, and no comment should be made if no evidence has been brought forward, 156 or if the evidence was improperly admitted.'-' did not fit defendant, in support of claim that defendant's companion committed robbery, constituted a testimonial appearance warranting judge's comments that defendant had failed to deny other evidence). See People v. Garrison, 246 Cal. App. 2d 343, 54 Cal. Rptr. 731 (1966) , cert. denied,,389 U. S. 915 (1967) (while it is proper to refer to a demonstration which is in evidence, improper to refer to defendant's refusal to put on stocking mask until state's witnesses had left courtroom). 42 (1970) .
155 State v. Brooks, 197 Ariz. 320, 487 P.2d 387 (1971) (defendant tended to flirt with the truth, and he did so the previous week and a jury found him guilty, proper where defendant testified as to his recent conviction); People v. Jones, 123 Ill. App. 2d 123, 260 N.E.2d 8 (1970) (proper to refer to defendant as a "twice convicted fellow" and a "convicted stickup man" where two prior convictions in evidence); Jefferson v. State, 452 S.W.2d 462 (Mo. 1970 ) (proper to refer to robbery and kidnapping where in evidence in robbery prosecution); State v. Laurence, 423 S.W.2d 807 (Mo. 1968 ); People v. LeBeause, 34 App. Div. 2d 596, 308 N.Y.S.2d 270 (1970) (proper to refer to conviction admitted by defendant in testimony); Kennedy v. State, 443 P.2d 127 (Okla. Crim. App. 1968) ; Poole v. Commonwealth, 211 Va. 262, 176 S.E.2d 917 (1970) (may introduce evidence of prior crime to attack defendant's character if he has testified or has attempted to show his good character).
156 United States v. Schartner, 426 F.2d 470 (3d Cir. 1970 ) (improper to permit reading of a portion of defendant's statement which mentioned a prior conviction); Rogers v. United States, 411 F.2d 228 (10th Cir. 1969 ) (references to jail stays are improper where no convictions shown); Homer v. Florida, 312 F.
Prosecutors often attempt three rather subtle methods of calling juror attention to the defendant's prior crimes in cases in which no such evidence was presented. The first is to refer to the accused's "rap sheet" or to the appearance of his picture in police files. Each of these has been condemned repeatedly by the courts.'" The second method, comment upon testimony that a witness met the defendant during incarceration, is also improper. 59 The third, equally improper in most cases, is suggestion that the defendant is an habitual criminal or professional miscreant."' Supp. 1292 (M.D. Fla. 1967 ); People v. Rolon, 66 Cal. 2d 690,427 P.2d 196, 58 Cal. Rptr. 596 (1967) 2d 433 (1968) (court martial conviction should not have been read to jury and commented upon). 1" Shaddox v. State, 244 Ark. 747, 427 S.W.2d 198 (1968) (rap sheet)*; Jones v. State, 194 So. 2d 24 (Fla. App. 1967 ) (mug shots)*; People v. Marra, 27 Mich. App. 1, 183 N.W.2d 418 (1970) (reference to photo of defendant identified by complaining witess as being in "mug file"); State v. Madison, 281 Minn. 170 159 Barfield v. United States, 391 F.2d 251 (5th Cir. 1968 ); People v. Dunn, 26 App. Div. 2d 285, 275 N.Y.S.2d 285 (1966) (witness's testimony that defendant said he had met co-defendant while they were being returned to prison)*.
160 People v. Tyson, 130 Ill. App. 2d 140, 264 N.E.2d 403 (1970) ("professional auto thief" where only one prior conviction shown, improper); Lynch v. Common-
Even if the evidence is properly in the record the prosecutor must be cautious not to assume facts in connection with the prior crimes beyond those shown by the evidence.l& Similarly, the prosecutor must confine his remarks to the purposes for which the proof was admitted, which usually restricts his comments to the credibility of the defendant.'62 The only exception in which the remarks may relate more directly to guilt is where the evidence of prior similar convictions is considered probative of intent or motive to commit the present offense.'6
The prosecutor is not restricted to referring only to prior cases in which a conviction of the defendant was obtained. App. 1968 ) (where defendant admitted prior conviction, but no evidence as to the specific nature of the crime was admitted, argument that "less than 44 days after he got out of prison he is back robbing and doing the very same thing for which he was put in there the first time")*.
16 State v. Coury, 4 Ariz. App. 339, 420 P.2d 582 (1966) ; People v. Asta, 251 Cal App. 2d 64, 59 Cal. Rptr. 206 (1967) (prosector stated that defendant had prior convictions for similar offense and judge did little to dispel impression that jury could consider such as evidence of guilt); People v. Forbis, 109 Il. App. 2d 220, 248 N.E.2d 298 (1969) ; Conway v. State, 7 Md. App. 400, 256 A.2d 178 (1969) (prosecutor stated that defendant had prior convictions for similar offense and judge did little to dispel impression that jury could consider such as evidence of guilt)*; State v. Cheek, 413 S.W.2d 231 (Mo. 1967 ); State v. Sinclair, 57 N.J. 56, 269 A.2d 161 (1970) ; People v. Childers, 28 App. Div. 2d 725, 281 N.Y.S.2d 706 (1967) on other law violations which the defendant admits are proper.'"
Conduct, Character and Appearance of the Defendant
The prosecutor may wish to discuss the defendant's conduct for two reasons. First, actions in the course of the crime and the investigation of it may be probative of guilt. Second, evidence of conduct in general may refute the accused's assertion of good character and reputation.
The same rule governing comments on the evidence is applicable to comments on the character of the defendant-the remarks must be based in the evidence or be reasonable inferences therefrom.' 65 The statements may relate to the accused's conduct in the course of or after the crime which is the basis for the prosecution. State v. Allison, 1 N.C. App. 623, 162 S.E.2d 63 (1968) (in bench trial, stating that several other cases were pending against the defendant). But see Rogers v. United States, 411 F.2d 228 (10th Cir. 1969) ; People v. Lewis, 25 Ill. 2d 396, 185 N.E.2d 168 (1962) State v. McGill, 101 Ariz. 320, 419 P.2d 499 (1966) (same); Smith v. State, 118 Ga. App. 464, 164 S.E.2d 238 (1968) (that defendant was "pushing women" in burglary prosecution, the only evidence being that defendant was an informer in prostitution cases)*; People v. Smith, 24 ll. 2d 198, 181 N.E.2d 77 (1962); Webb v. Commonwealth, 451 S.W.2d 397 (Ky. Crim. App. 1970) (suggesting that defendant a draft evader improper).
166 People v. Talbot, 64 Cal. 2d 691, 414 P.2d 633, 51 Cal. Rptr. 417 (1967) (brutality of defendant's acts and that he had never shown remorse, proper); People v. Mentola, 47 fll. 2d 579, 268 N.E.2d 8 (1971) (flight); People v. Sawyer, 42 Il1. 2d 289, 251 N.E.2d 230, cert. denied, 396 U.S. 928 (1969) ; People v. Carter, 38 Ill. 2d 496, 232 N.E.2d 692, cert. denied, 391 U.S. 965 (1967) (confession); Commonwealth v. Brown, 354 Mass. 337, 237 N.E.2d 53 (1968) (calling defendant an "expert in furs" proper where evidence showed defendant had advised co-defendant which furs to take during robbery of furrier); State v. Mastrian, 285 Minn. 51, 171 N.W.2d 695, cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1049 ("merchant of murder" where defendant had hired another to kill); Hoover v. State, 449 S.W.2d 60 (Tex. Crim. App. 1969) or not the defendant testifies at the trial, the prosecutor may be able to refer to the defendant's pre-trial statements or to conversations with law enforcement officers. 117 The prosecutor may also conament on the accused's conduct in court, 16 8 as well as conduct at other times and places. 1 6 9 Wash. 2d 936, 442 P.2d 959 (1968) (defendant had never shoin any remorse, improper); State v. Noyes, 69 Wash. 2d 441, 418 P.2d 471 (1966) (illicit sex relations with witness).
167 United States v. Chaney, 446 F.2d 571 (3d Cir. 1971) (an exculpatory statement made with the intent to divert suspicion or mislead the police, when shown to be false, may have probative force and be commented upon); United States v. Smith, 441 F.2d 539 (9th Cir. 1971 ) (statement to FBI agent properly in evidence); United States v. Toler, 440 F.2d 1242 (5th Cir. 1971 ) (at no time had defendant denied filing a pre-trial statement in evidence, not a comment on defendant's failure to testify); United States v. Biassick, 422 F.2d 652 (7th Cir. 1970 ) (agent's testimony not denied); Vitali v. United States, 383 F.2d 121 (1st Cir. 1967 ) (proper to draw inference of ownership of premises where stolen goods found from defendant's conversation with officers ind his conduct at time of arrest); Hayes v. United States, 368 F.2d 814 (9th Cir. 1966 ) (statements made when informed crime committed compared with alibi at trial); Wright v. State, 279 Ala. 543, 188 So. 2d 272 (1966) (pre-trial statements); Shaddox v. State, 244 Ark. 747, 427 S.W.2d 198 (1968) (that defendant had made statement to witness); People v. Gills, 241 Cal. App. 2d 711, 50 Cal. Rptr. 872 (1966) (conversation with arresting officer); People v. Asey, 85 Ill. App. 2d 210, 229 N.E.2d 368 (1967) (pre-trial questioning); State v. Whiters, 206 Kan. 770, 481 P.2d 992 (1971) (inconsistencies in defendant's testimony and explanation at time of arrest); Commonwealth v, Belton, 352 Mass. 263, 225 N.E.2d 53 (1967) (inconsistencies in alibi asserted at trial and statements at time of arrest); People v. Badge, 15 Mich. App. 29, 165 N.W.2d 901 (1968) (pre-trial statement); State v. Edwards, 435 S.W.2d 1 (Mo. 1968 ) (reference to original interrogation of defendant proper where related to evidence); Ervine v. State, 463 S.W.2d 2 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971) (that defendant had testified against himself in pre-trial statements properly in evidence).
168 United States v. Izzi, 427 F.2d 293 (2d Cir. 1970 ) (accusation that defendant had sought to disguise his handwriting in giving exemplars); Hayes v. United States, 368 F.2d 814 (9th Cir. 1966 ) (defendant's conduct during agent's testimony); State v. Totress, 197 Ariz. 8, 480 P.2d 668 (1971) ; People v. Thomas, 65 Cal. 698, 423 P.2d 233, 56 Cal. Rptr. 305 (1967) ("regular smart aleck" proper as a characterization of defendant's conduct during cross-examination); People v. Garrison, 246 Cal. App. 2d 343, 54 Cal. Rptr. 731 (1966 ), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 915 (1967 .
169 People v. Fortson, 110 Ill. App. 2d 206, 249 N.E.2d 260 (1969) -(that drinking shown by evidence gave defendant a little extra power to perform rape); People v. Porterfield, 13 ll. App. 2d 167, 268 N.E.2d 537 (1968) (illicit sexual relations with victim); Coates v. Commonwealth, 469 S.W.2d 346 (Ky. Crim. App. 1971) (suggesting defendant charged with possession only was trafficking in narcotics)*; People v. Pena, 3 Mich. App. 26, 141 N.W.2d 677 (1966) (rhetorical question how many narcotics sales defendant had There is some disagreement among the courts concerning whether the use of invective or epithets in characterizing the accused is proper, even when based upon proven conduct.
1 7° Whatever the view of a particular jurisdiction, a great variety of disparaging language has been permitted,
7
' perhaps made in 41 days between the sale charged and his arrest, improper); People v. Damon, 24 N.Y.2d 256, 247 N.E.2d 651, 229 N.Y.S.2d 830 (1969) (implying that because defendant had been in prison he was homosexual or abnormal deviate)*; People v. Chance, 37 App. Div. 2d 572, 322 N.Y.S.2d 433 (1971) (suggesting defendant charged with possession only was trafficking in narcotics)*; People v. Canty, 31 App. Div. 2d 976, 299 N.Y.S.2d 524 (1969) (where prosecutor went beyond merely asking jury to disbelieve defendant who admitted committing adultery, and turned defendant's admitted acts into equivalence of guilt of violating Ten Commandments, he was using defendant's acts to indicate his propensity to commit murder, not just to Impeach his credibility); State v. Milbradt, 68 Wash. 2d 684, 415 P.2d 2, cerl. denied, 385 U.S. 905 (1966) (references to homosexual tendencies proper where discussed by defense psychiatrist). 270 Carter v. United States, 437 F.2d 692 (D.C, Cir. 1970 ), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 912 (1971 (should avoid inappropriate references); People v. Rodriquez, 10 Cal. App. 2d 18, 88 Cal. Rptr. 789 (1970) (may use appropriate epithets where warranted by the nature of the case and the evidence adduced; prosecutor is allowed to urge his case with vigor); People v. Elder, 25 Ill. 2d 612, 186 N.E.2d 27, cert. denied, 374 U.S. 814 (1962) (use of invective discouraged); People v. Jefferson, 69 Ill. App. 2d 490, 217 N.E.2d 564 (1966) (abstract only: proper to reflect unfavorably on accused and to use invective); State v. Yates, 202 Kan. 406, 449 P.2d 575 (1968) (use of invective discouraged); State v. Burnett, 429 S.W.2d 239 (Mo. 1968 ) (should not apply unbecoming names to defendant); State v. Turnbull, 403 S.W.2d 570 (Mo. 1966 ) (improper to a pply personal epithets or engage in abusive vilification of either parties or witnesses); State v. White, 151 Mont. 573, 440 P.2d 269 (1968) (should not use derogatory epithets); State v. Miller, 271 N.C. 646, 157 S.E.2d 335 (1967) (should not indulge in vulgarities, and should refrain from abusive, vituperative, and opprobrious language, and from indulging in invective); State v. Gibson, 75 Wash. 2d 174, 449 P.2d 692 (1969) , cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1019 (1970) .
'71 United States v. Cook, 432 F.2d 1093 (7th Cir. 1970 (where defendant plotted to kill wife by putting bomb on plane, proper to refer to him as a subhuman man and a true monster with a rancid, rotten mind);
United States v. Lewis, 423 F.2d 457 (8th Cir. 1970) (junk pusher); Downie v. Burke, 408 F.2d 343 (7th Cir. 1969 ) (big ape and gorilla); United States v. Wolfson, 322 F. Supp. 798 (D.Del. 1971) ("crooks," "viruses? and "germs" proper) ; Miller v. State, 250 Ark. 199, 464 S.W.2d 594 (1971) (con artist); People v. Newman, 14 Cal. App. 3d 246, 92 Cal. Rptr. 205 (1971) (pill peddler and terror to community); People v. Rodriquez, 10 Cal. App. 3d 18, 88 Cal. Rptr. 789 (1970) (smart thief and parasite on the community); People v. Walker, 247 Cal. App. 2d 554, 55 Cal. Rptr. 726, cer. denied, 389 U.S. 824 (1967) (suede shoe boys and aluminum siding racketeers); People v. Gairson, 246 Cal. App. 2d 343, 54 Cal. Rptr. 731 (1966 ), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 915 (1967 (vicious murderous pig) ;
because a reviewing court is reluctant to find reversible error on characterization alone. Furthermore, such remarks may be appropriate if based upon the charge which the evidence tends to prove, rather than upon the conduct of the defendant as shown by the evidence. A common example is reference to one charged with armed robbery as a potential murderer.ln An epithet which lacks a reasonable foundation in the evidence or the charge is improper; it is simply abusive and serves only to inflame and arouse the passions and prejudices of the jury.1n O' Bryant v. State, 222 Ga. 326, 149 S.E.2d 654 (1966) (thug); People v. Myers, 35 Ill. 2d 311, 220 N.E.2d 297 (1966) (where defense counsel compared defendant's conduct and ability to choose between right and wrong with chimpanzee, dog, and trained animal, based on psychiatrist's testimony, proper for prosecutor to reply that defendant had morals of a snake and was a slimy beast); Ferguson v. Commonwealth, 401 S.W.2d 225 (Ky. Crim. App. 1965 ) (beast); State v. Kohuth, 287 Minn. 520, 176 N.W.2d 872 (1970) (under some circumstances, it may be reversible error to characterize defendant as offender; here, it was proper to refer to defendant as robber where witness identified him); State v Cir. 1968 ) (defendant was doubly vicious because, knowing he was guilty, he demanded his constitutional rights, including right to trial, at which victim of alleged homosexual extortion ring was required to testify)*; People v. Trotter, 84 Ill.
The prosecutor may comment on the reputation and character of the accused only when the defendant has put such matters in issue, and the comments must be reasonably justified by the evidence.
4
If the defendant's physical appearance is gross in nature, the physical attributes are certainly obvious to the jury and emphasis should not be added through prosecutorial comment.
7 5 The exception is where identification is put in issue by the defendant himself or his counsel; under such circumstances it may be appropriate for the prosecutor to comment upon the appearance of the defendant. 964 (1971) . But see Chamberlain v. State, 46 Ala. App. 642, 247 So. 2d 683 (1971) (asking jury to remember defendant as he appeared in line-up picture in which his clothes were dirty and wrinkled, rather than the way he was in court with a polish job put on him by his lawyers, where not directed to issue of identity but was an unfair comparison of his appearance in court with his appearance in the picture, and imputed unethical conduct on part of defense counsel) ; Spencer v. State, 466 S.W.2d 749 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971) (stating that defense counsel would have had defendant in court with sunglasses or with a sack over his head if he could have, improper where identification in issue).
Failure to Cooperate Before Trial
As indicated earlier, the prosecutor may properly refer to statements made by the defendant before trial where such statements constitute a waiver of the fifth amendment right to remain silentY m The general rule, though, is that the defendant's silence before trial is not a proper subject for comment, at least his silence subsequent to arrest.' 7 8 It is not dear whether the defendant's decision to testify at the trial constitutes a waiver of the right to remain silent before as well as during the trial, thus making comment on either situation proper.' 7 9 Similarly, the courts have generally condemned remarks referring to the failure of the accused to make' an exculpatory statement at the time of arrest,"8 0 since this is merely another 'way of 17 Se note 167 supra, and accompanying text. 178 Giison v. United States, 399 F.2d 586 (D.C. Cir. 1968 ) (where defendant testified he did not want to make a statement without presence of counsel, saying "that's the action of an innocent man who went looking for a job")*; People v. Haston, 69 Cal. 2d 233, 444 P.2d 91, 70 Cal. Rptr. 419 (1968) (commenting on extra-judicial silence and evasive answers in face of accusatory statements, and urging jury to draw adverse inference)*; State v. Dearman, 198 Kan. 44, 422 P.2d 573 (1967) (discussing defendant's refusal to make a statement at arrest without presence of attorney so as to create an adverse inference)*; People v. Rolston, 31 Mich. App. 200, 187 N.W.2d 454 (1971) (rule regarding failure to testify applies to pre-custody interrogation, though any statement made before trial may be admitted regardless of whether defendant takes the stand; here permitting prosecution to prove that defendant chose to exercise privilege to remain silent pretrial)*; People v. Williams, 26 Mich. App. 218, 182 N.W.2d 347 (1970) (asking jurors whether they would have just sat there or would have said something when approached by officer and told that he was investigating crime)*; State v. Russell, 282 Minn. 223, 164 N.W.2d 65, cert. denied, 396 U.S. 850 (1969) ("But what harm is there in talking if you are honest and above board and have nothing to hide" was improper as comment on codefendant's refusal to give name or answer questions during interview after arrest); State v. Davison, 457 S.W.2d 674 (Mo. 1970) ; State v. Macon, 57 N.J. 325, 273 A.2d 1 (1971) (improper to refer to defendant's calling an attorney as not the act of an innocent man); People v. Moore, 26 App. Div. 2d 902, 274 N.Y.S.2d 518 (1966) ; State v. Stephens, 24 Ohio St. 2d 76, 263 N.E.2d 773 (1970) . But see, United States v. Marcus, 401 F.2d 563 (2d Cir. 1968 ) cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1040 (pointing out failure to answer questions before trial was not a comment on failure to testify); State v. Green, 70 Wash. 2d 955, 425 P.2d 913 (1967) .
17 Compare People v. Bell, 32 Mich. App. 375, 188 N.W.2d 909 (1971) (where defendant testified at trial, not error to comment that defendant refused to make any statements after arrest; no violation of either state or federal constitutions) willt People v. Rolston, 31 Mich. App. 200, 187 N.W.2d 454 (1971) and State v. Stephens, 24 Ohio St. 2d 76, 263 N.E.2d 773 (1970) .
180 United States v. Arnold, 425 F.2d 204 (10th Cir. 1970 ) (if all defendant was doing was an experiment pointing out the defendant's silence. It has also been deemed improper to comment upon the defendant's invocation of the fifth amendment in -prior judicial proceedings, regardless of whether the defendant was the accused or a witness.m In those situations in which the courts have held that no privilege to refuse to cooperate exists, comment on such refusal, if properly proved, is permissible. Thus it is proper to point out that the defendant refused to participate in a lineup," 2 or, with the exception of the polygraph,"2 to remark and not making a bomb, he would have told agents; not invited by defense argument that agents never asked defendant whether he was conducting an experiment)*; United States v. Winters, 420 F.2d 523 (3d Cir. 1970) (man without guilty knowledge would have denied seeing bag containing stolen money); United ' States v. Noland, 416 F.2d 588 (10th Cir. 1969) App. 1969 ) (comment on failure to make exculpatory statement after arrest prohibited; but comment on defendant's conduct when he saw police arrive was proper, since he was not then under arrest or in custody); People v. Christman, 23 N.Y.2d 429, 244 N.E.2d 703, 297 N.Y.S.2d 134 (1969) (that defendant had not told police of alibi at time of arrest)*; State ex rd. Simos v. Burke, 41 Wis. 2d 129, 163 N.W.2d 177 (1968) (if defendant elects not to give notice of alibi pursuant to notice of alibi statute, that fact cannot be commented upon, and if he elects to do so and subsequently does not assert alibi at trial, this is not to be commented upon either). But cf. State v. Crank, 13 Ariz. App. 587, 480 P.2d 8 (1971) ' (suggests that lack of exculpatory statement at time of arrest is proper for comment); State v. Burt, 107 NJ. Super. 390, 258 A.2d 711 (1969) (proper to say if shooting had been accidental, as defendant claimed at trial, he would have told police officers at the earliest opportunity).
1 Stewart v. United States, 366 U.S. 1 (1961) (crossexamination of defendant which disclosed his failure to testify at two prior trials was in part reversible error);, State v. Minamyer, 12 Ohio St. 2d 67, 232 N.E.2d 401 (1967) (refusal of defendant to testify before grand jury when he was complaining witness)*; State v. Davis, 10 Ohio St. 2d 136, 226 N.E.2d 736 (1967) ) (where defendant testified at punishment stage, improper to remark on his failure to testify at guilt stage). But cf. State v. Hines, 195 So. 2d 550 (Fla. 1967 ) (proper to cross-examine defendant regarding his failure to testify at preliminary hearing).
1 United States v. Wade, 388 U. S. 218 (1967) (no privilege not to participate in line-up nor to speak for identification purposes); United States v. Parhms, 424 F.2d 152 (9th Cir. 1970) . 18 People v. Brocato, 17 Mich. App. 277, 169 N.W.2d 483 (1969) (neither results of polygraph nor any references to such are proper or admissible); State v. Perry, 274 Minn. 1, 142 N.W.2d 573 (1966) (same). [Vol. 64 on the failure of the accused to cooperate in the performance of certain experiments or tests.
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Guilt Consistent with the right to comment on the state of the evidence in the case, it is proper for the prosecutor to argue or express the opinion that the accused is guilty, but only where the prosecutor states or it is apparent that the opinion is based solely on the evidence.s' As in other contexts, the prosecutor must not make the statement one of personal belief, thereby suggesting to the I" Gilbert v. California jury that there is other convincing evidence of the defendant's guilt which is not before them.
186 Accordingly, the test adopted by the federal courts for determining the propriety of the statement is whether the remark might reasonably lead the jury to believe that there was other evidence unknown or unavailable to it upon which the prosecutor's belief rested187
While it is unclear whether the phrases "I think" and "I believe" are proper, 5 ' a statement of personal belief is not proper merely because the prosecutor offers it as fact without the use of such phrases. 
COM MNTING ON THE DEFENSE AND DEFENSE
COUNSEL
Failure to Produce Witnesses
Since the burden of proof is on the government, the defense has the right to comment on the state's unexplained failure to produce witnesses.'9 And even though the defense is not bound to present a case, it has been pointed out that the prosecutor may comment that no defense was pre-In limiting the above, the courts have emphasized that any comments on an absent witness may be improper where the witness is equally available or accessible to the government, though the presumptions and burdens in proving availability are not dear."' If the witness is equally accessible it is not error for the prosecutor to reply to a question propounded by defense counsel during summation. 199 If defense counsel's question concerns the whereabouts of certain witnesses it is proper for the prosecutor to ask why the same persons were not produced by the defense. 2 00 Moreover, where the defendant attempts to explain the absence of a witness while testifying, the prosecutor may then refer to that absence, although such commentary is not otherwise permitted.
20°A
lthough it is generally improper to refer to the fact that certain co-defendants failed to testify, (2) would elucidate transaction); Slater v. State, 43 Ala. App. 513, 194 So. 2d 93 (1966) (failure to call equally accessible or available witness is not proper subject for comment; available or accessible does not mean merely amenable to subpoena, and depends upon a party's superior means of knowledge of existence and identity of witness, of testimony that might be expected, or upon relationship of witness to the party; here, refusing defense permission to comment upon refusal of state to call eyewitness who was a relative of victim and thus not equally accessible, where prosecutor only gave unsworn testimony as to reasons for absence)*; Conyers v failure of a defendant to produce his co-defendants as witnesses. 23 The courts have been harsher where the absent witness was not a defendant, but one who would have to incriminate himself. 204 Where the uncalled witness is the defendant's spouse, the propriety of a comment on the failure to call will depend upon the particular statute creating the husband-wife privilege.
2 5
While the court may permit reference to the failure of the defense to produce a witness or witnesses, especially in light of the currently confused state of the law, it is dangerous for the prosecutor to go further by arguing that the testimony would have been adverse. point out the number of crimes that go unpunished,?A and stress the responsibility of the jury for law enforcementYO MrIIGATING FACTORS In addition to the above limitations, there are several doctrines which may affect the attitude of the trial and reviewing courts toward a remark which on its face would seem improper. These doctrines to some extent broaden the bounds of propriety while at the same time imposing some new limitations.
RETALIATORY STATEMENTS AND REMARKS
When counsel believes that opposing counsel has' made an improper comment, it should be called to the attention of the court as soon as possible through an objection 2 However, it is well established that the prosecutor has the right to make a fair reply to an argument previously made by the defense. Furthermore, the defense has no grounds for objection at trial or complaint on review where the prosecutor's remarks were invited or provoked by the improper comments of the defense, even though the prosecutor's remarks would otherwise be improper. 45 This principle applies generally to all the limitations discussed above.
-tor's transgression is considered cured where the trial court sustains the objection and either admonishes the jury to disregard, instructs the jury to disregard, or rebukes the prosecutor, or any combination of these which the trial court believes necessary to remove possible prejudice. 55 It is only when the error is so fundamental that it canInot be cured by these methods that the trial court need resort to the more drastic remedy of mistrial.
Besides corrective action by the court, it has been held in some cases that the prosecutor 256 or even the defense attorney 257 had taken sufficient action to himself remedy the error.
Miscellaneous Considerations A~ffecting the Appellate Decision
In determining whether substantial prejudice to the defendant resulted from the prosecutorial summation, reviewing courts have looked to six other factors besides the law and the exact words used. First, the courts consider the strength of the evidence in the case, applying the standard harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.n 8 Thus, if the reviewing court finds overwhelming evidence of guilt, it will probably uphold the conviction, even though it may point to some improprieties which were properly preserved and before the court on re-Fourth, the court may take into account the length of the trial or the length of the argument. It may be that a misstatement in a short trial is not serious error, since the jurors should have an independent recollection of the evidence. On the other hand, a lengthy argument after a long trial is more likely to be imperfect, and minor transgressions in this setting may also be excused.
Fifth, the court may consider the atmosphere of the courtroom throughout the trial, and may be more reluctant to find reversible error where the case was "hotly contested" on both sides. 266 Finally, where the error in summation alone is not sufficient to require reversal, the court may then examine the cumulative effect of this impropriety in conjunction with other errors which occurred during the rest of the triaVl CONCLUSION It is clear that some fine distinctions have been made by the courts in an effort to reconcile the prosecutor's dual roles as impartial representative of the people and vigorous advocate for the state. The prosecutor may fail to meet both obligations in a particular case, performing one task to the exclusion of the other. The appellate court, however, does not sit primarily to enforce ethical or moral standards (though it may frequently speak to the question of what constitutes propriety), but rather to determine whether; all things considered, the defendant did in fact receive a fair trial. The case law of a particular jurisdiction will reveal few if any forms of speech or conduct during summation which are per se reversible error. It will suggest many forms which are potentially reversible error and generally improper. It is the combination of these with the particular facts of a case which will dictate the limits of propriety for the prosecutorial dosing argument.
The most important learning to be gained by a study of the foregoing is that most prosecutorial conduct and comment is considered by reviewing courts in the context in which it occurred. Given the disparate approaches by the various jurisdictions in which these cases arose, it is impractical, if not impossible, to generalize upon the result which will be reached in any given case. Nevertheless, in most cases there is evident in the court decisions an honorable effort to protect the defendant's right to a free and unbiased trial, while at the same time refraining from excessive impingement on the prosecutor's obligation to vigorously present his case.
